Deborah G. Mayo is a professor in the Department of Philosophy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, known as Virginia Tech, and holds a visiting appointment in the Center for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Science at the London School of Economics. She is the author of Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, which in 1998 won the Lakatos Prize, awarded for the most outstanding contribution to philosophy of science during the previous six years. Professor Mayo coedited the volume Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management (1991, with R. Hollander) and has published numerous articles on the philosophy and history of science and foundations of statistics and experimental inference and in interdisciplinary works on evidence relevant for regulation and policy. Aris Spanos is Wilson Schmidt Professor of Economics at Virginia Tech. He has also taught at Birkbeck College, London, the University of Cambridge, the University of California and the University of Cyprus. Professor Spanos is the author of Probability Theory and Statistical Inference (1999) and Statistical Foundations of Econometric Modeling (1986), both published by Cambridge University Press. Professor Spanos's research has appeared in journals such as the Journal of Econometrics, Econometric Theory, Econometric Reviews, and Philosophy of Science. His research interests include the philosophy and methodology of statistical inference and modeling, foundational problems in statistics, statistical adequacy, misspecification testing and respecification, resampling and simulation techniques and modeling speculative prices.

Part I. Introduction and Background: 1. Philosophy of methodological practice Deborah Mayo; 2. Error statistical philosophy Deborah Mayo and Aris Spanos; Part II: 3. Severe testing, error statistics, and the growth of theoretical knowledge Deborah Mayo; Part III: 4. Can scientific theories be warranted? Alan Chalmers; 5. Can scientific theories be warranted with severity? Exchanges with Alan Chalmers Deborah Mayo; Part IV: 6. Critical rationalism, explanation and severe tests Alan Musgrave; 7. Towards progressive critical rationalism: exchanges with Alan Musgrave Deborah Mayo; Part V: 8. Error, tests and theory-confirmation John Worrall; 9. Has Worrall saved his theory (on ad hoc saves) in a non ad hoc manner? Exchanges with Worrall Deborah Mayo; Part VI: 10. Mill's sins, or Mayo's errors? Peter Achinstein; 11. Sins of the Bayesian epistemologist: exchanges with Achinstein Deborah Mayo; Part VII: 12. Theory testing in economics and the error statistical perspective Aris Spanos; Part VIII: 13. Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference Deborah Mayo and David Cox; 14. Objectivity and conditionality in Frequentist inference David Cox and Deborah Mayo; 15. An error in the argument from WCP and S to the SLP Deborah Mayo; 16. On a new philosophy of Frequentist inference: exchanges with Cox and Mayo Aris Spanos; Part IX: 17. Explanation and truth Clark Glymour; 18. Explanation and testing: exchanges with Glymour Deborah Mayo; 19. Graphical causal modeling and error statistics: exchanges with Glymour Aris Spanos; Part X: 20. Legal epistemology: the anomaly of affirmative defenses Larry Laudan; 21. Error and the law: exchanges with Laudan Deborah Mayo.

Explores the nature of error and inference, drawing on exchanges on experimental reasoning, reliability, and the objectivity of science.